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A B S T R A C T
The current debate on the role of regional politics in the Euro-
pean Union (EU) is dominated by approaches that focus upon
either intergovernmental bargaining or multi-level govern-
ance. Because Structural Funds are the main EU-wide redis-
tributive policy, we propose to apply the traditional literature
on partisan politics and national redistribution to the case of
the EU. We use a new data set on both the distribution of
Structural Funds across regions and the distribution of vote
shares for different factions of the European Parliament.
These data provide empirical details for some of the partisan
competition that takes place at the regional level. Specifically,
we show that the traditional left vs. right cleavage can have
an impact on the size of regional transfers.
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Parties as the missing link in regional politics?
Despite the lively discussion in recent years about the role of political parties
in shaping European politics (e.g. Marks and Steenbergen, 2002), the analysis
of the role of party politics in determining political outcomes at the European
level has yet to develop. Many authors have referred to partisan motives
when, for example, explaining treaty revisions, but only recently has there
been a literature that systematically evaluates how partisanship affects politi-
cal outcomes at the European level (Manow et al., 2004). In this vein, the
article examines the influence of political partisanship on a specific policy
outcome at the European Union level, namely the interregional redistribution
in EU Structural Funds (SF) policy.
The current debate on the role of regional politics in the EU is dominated
by two strands of argument, neither of which ascribes a central role to politi-
cal parties. On the one hand, adherents of the intergovernmentalist perspec-
tive maintain that the political influence of regional actors is mostly absorbed
by the logic of bargaining between national governments (Pollack, 1995;
Allen, 2000). On the other hand, scholars devoted to the multi-level govern-
ance approach argue that the integration of new policy areas – and especially
the development of regional policy in the EU – has introduced regional actors
into the evolving political system and created a third level. In particular, the
so-called principle of partnership in the governance of SF has aroused
considerable academic interest, since it requires that planning procedures are
developed in close cooperation with subnational authorities such as local
governments or social partners (Evans, 1999).
SF policy is the key mechanism of regional redistribution in the EU for
which we propose an alternative route of investigation focusing on the role
of (regional) partisan politics. To derive our hypotheses we rely on the
traditional literature on partisan politics and redistribution at the national
level. Partisan politics may act as a ‘missing link’ in the debate between the
approaches of intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance, because it
relates preferences to ideology rather than to the political fissures between
national and regional actors. Empirically, we investigate the relationship
between regional variation in partisan preferences – left vs. right and pro-
Europe vs. anti-Europe – and the level of SF per capita that the respective
regions receive. For this purpose we have constructed a data set that combines
regional information on both elections and SF transfers. Our results indicate
that there is a visible, though not very robust, relationship between the
strength of left-wing political parties in a region and the size of the transfers
that region receives. We also find a similar link between Eurosceptic parties
and transfers, but this result is more sensitive to influential outliers.
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Regional partisan politics applied to EU regional policy
Most political scientists agree that political parties play a pivotal role at the
national level. Parties represent the ideological cleavages within the elec-
torate, and should therefore affect policy. EU studies, however, are dominated
by functionalist, institutionalist or intergovernmentalist approaches in which
political parties are not at the centre of analysis. Research on parties in the
EU has therefore focused mainly on either European elections (Van der Eijk
and Franklin, 1996) or the formation of the party system in the European
Parliament (Hix and Lord, 1997). Because the consequences of partisan
politics for EU policies have remained largely unnoticed, we will first explore
the literature of partisan preferences and redistribution at the national level.
Next, we will compare the SF policy of the EU with national redistribution.
Finally, we will derive two hypotheses that link partisan politics and inter-
regional redistribution in the EU.
Partisan politics and national redistribution
It is not at all obvious that partisan ideology can be ‘mapped’ into prefer-
ences for redistribution at a national level. In fact, the standard Downsian
approach to political competition argues that parties should completely
converge and that the size of redistribution depends merely on the character-
istics of the median voter. An example is the hypothesis that the size of
redistribution is determined by the relationship between median and mean
income in a society (Meltzer and Richard, 1991). Wittman (1983) was one of
the first to propose an alternative model that allows for ideological partisan
preferences. Roemer (2001: 72) takes up his idea and shows that divergence
between partisan manifestos is likely only if the Wittman model assumes
uncertainty about the precise distribution of voter preferences.
The partisan argument has figured prominently in numerous empirical
studies that investigate the amount of welfare spending in advanced econ-
omies (Huber et al., 1993), the specific form of redistributive policies imple-
mented (Boix, 1998) or the link between party manifestos and the policies of
incumbent parties (Klingemann et al., 1994). The empirical record is ambiva-
lent, however, since a simple mapping of partisan ideology into policy output
is difficult. First, the ideological structure of the ‘voter space’ may go beyond
a simple one-dimensional division between ‘left’ and ‘right’. Second, politi-
cal institutions affect the aggregation of voters’ preferences. It has been
argued, for instance, that proportional or multi-party systems spend more
money on redistribution than do majoritarian ones (Persson, 2002).
The second point is particularly relevant for multi-tier political systems
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that are characterized by a complicated decision-making process of fiscal
federalism. The addition of a cleavage between different political layers
makes theoretical predictions fairly difficult (e.g. Dixit and Londregan, 1998;
Persson, 2002). Depending on the specific nature of the federalist institutions,
subnational entities may have an incentive to extract rents from the central
government. However, this effect is not unambiguous because decentraliza-
tion arguably reduces the total level of rent extraction (see Rodden and
Wibbels, 2002). In particular, the political economy of fiscal federalism does
not render the partisan argument obsolete. For instance, Cadot et al. (2002)
build a model that combines both partisan and pork-barrel politics in a model
for national regional policy.
To conclude, the partisan model of public redistribution is far from
flawless, but it remains the strongest competitor to political economy-based
explanations along the lines of Anthony Downs. It clearly constitutes a simpli-
fication, but it deserves consideration as a parsimonious explanation of inter-
regional redistribution in the EU.
Comparing national and EU-wide politics of
interregional redistribution
EU regional policy fulfils the classic criteria of a redistributive policy. This is
visible in the overall objectives governing the distributive mechanism, which
have been reorganized under the recent Agenda 2000 reform into three focal
areas: ‘Objective 1’ for the development of regions that are lagging behind in
their economic development; ‘Objective 2’ for regions with declining indus-
trial and rural sectors; and ‘Objective 3’ for the promotion of skill and employ-
ment policies in regions other than for ‘Objective 1’. To qualify for Objective
1, the per capita GDP of a region must lie below 75% of the EU average. Objec-
tive 2 covers industrial regions with an unemployment rate above the EU
average and a declining employment rate in the manufacturing sector.
The fact that Objective 1 is given clear financial priority shows the domi-
nance of redistribution from rich to poor regions. Although the total amount
of SF is not particularly large – around 0.3% of the GDP of the EU – it is
significant for some regions. Regional redistribution in the EU currently
accounts for one-third of the budget of the European Union. In the period
2000–6, the regions that receive most SF on a per capita basis are Madeira,
with €2870 and the Azores, with €3590. These facts, taken together, show that,
among all EU policies, SF are most directly comparable to national redistrib-
utive mechanisms.
The EU decision-making process is more complex and dynamic than
national systems of fiscal federalism. The governance of SF has been evolving
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over the past two decades as a result of major reforms in 1988, 1992–3 and
1999 (Bache, 1998; Bailey and De Propris, 2002). Its complexity stems from
several principles governing the allocation of regional transfers. One of these
principles is ‘additionality’, which requires that SF transfers do not supersede
national regional aid. Some scholars have argued that this principle was advo-
cated primarily by regional actors and the Commission (Bache, 1998) in order
to increase their budgets.1 It is difficult, however, for the Commission to
monitor nation-states on grounds of additionality (Allen, 2000: 257) since the
implementation of structural policies is in the domain of nation-states.
Another important principle is ‘partnership’. According to it, planning
procedures for SF should be developed in cooperation with subnational
actors, such as local governments and social partners (Hooghe, 1998; Evans,
1999). However, the 1988 reform granted a strong position to the Commission,
which needs to approve the eligibility of a region under Objectives 1 and 2
(Hooghe and Keating, 1994). This seems to override the influence of sub-
national actors on the shaping of EU Structural Funds policy (Allen, 2000).
Furthermore, national and EU-level politics differ,2 and there is an
important debate about how to structure the political space in Europe (Hix
and Lord, 1997; Gabel and Anderson, 2002). One of the crucial questions is
whether there is an independent ‘pro-EU’ vs. ‘anti-EU’ cleavage alongside the
traditional left vs. right cleavage. There is evidence that these two cleavages
are at least not perfectly collinear, in that the EU topic becomes more and
more established as a dimension of its own (Marks and Steenbergen, 2002).
In this case, the redistributive logic of SF policies may not be a conflict just
between richer and poorer regions. There are Eurosceptic parties at the
regional level, mostly consisting of smaller and ideologically more radical-
ized parties (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002). If Eurosceptic parties represent
the losers from political integration, such as in those regions that benefit very
little from the common market or monetary union, then they may have an
impact on political outcomes. Boeri et al. (2002) argue that EU regional policy
is aimed at precisely those regions that stand apart from the prospering core
areas of economic integration. Hence, if there is an element of compensation
attached to the distribution of SF, it may well be that this is a consequence of
regional parties voicing their unease about integration.
All in all, SF policy is primarily about redistribution from rich to poor or
declining regions. The bargaining and monitoring process of SF policy is
rather complex, because it requires the interaction of three levels of govern-
ment in accordance with the principles mentioned above and the set of criteria
for Objectives 1 and 2. Moreover, the underlying voter space differs in one
respect from national politics: there is a cleavage between pro- and anti-
European positions. This cleavage arguably plays a minor role in national
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redistribution but it has to be kept in mind when we apply the partisan
hypothesis to the bargaining on regional redistribution in the EU.
The bargaining process and channels of partisan
influence on SF policy
There are two different logics embedded in the bargaining process. On the
one hand, the Commission, the Council and the regional actors bargain over
the selection of regions. On the other hand, regional actors try to influence
the distribution of SF in a country. Both processes are intertwined, but they
do not necessarily follow the same logic, as a closer inspection of the insti-
tutional rules shows.3 The Council of Ministers first drafts a budgetary
envelope for each Objective. The Commission then uses so-called ‘transparent
procedures’ (i.e. official criteria) to distribute the budget between member
states. Since not all of these criteria are operationalized in detail, the
Commission has some discretionary power. However, the rule that national
governments provide the short-lists of regions to the Commission limits this
leeway. In the structural programming phase, the national governments and
regional actors cooperate in designing specific development plans for each
and every region. Member states must compile a selection of eligible Objec-
tive 1 and 2 regions with corresponding financial allocations. Once the plans
are elaborated, the Commission and member states transform the plans into
binding legal commitments.4
Moreover, the 1999 bargaining process was embedded in negotiations on
the general budgetary process for the period 2000–6. This meant that there
was simultaneous bargaining on the size of the national shares between
national governments (Heinelt et al., 2005: 116). The link between the two
processes is arguably the selection of regions to qualify for SF, since this deter-
mines the size of national budgets. Intergovernmental negotiations on the EU
budget have been studied extensively by many authors (Rodden, 2002;
Kauppi and Widgrén, 2004; Zimmer et al., 2005). In contrast to these studies,
we are interested in the regional and not the national redistribution of SF. To
simplify the following analyses we focus on the impact that parties have on
the amount of regional transfers once national SF shares have been negoti-
ated. Making this assumption allows us to abstain from dealing extensively
with the various package deals between agricultural, cohesion and structural
transfers, as well as the debate about the net payment position of countries.
This assumption is problematic in that the selection of regions (for which
international bargaining is important) and the allocation of funds (for which
interregional bargaining is important) necessarily affect each other. Neverthe-
less, it has some empirical foundation, since the Berlin summit in 1999 yielded
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an agreement on the national distribution of SF but the precise regional allo-
cation of SF was negotiated afterwards (Heinelt et al., 2005: 131).
Partisan politics at a regional level can intrude on this decision-making
process at the level of regional transfers through two political channels.
Regional actors can lobby either the next higher national level or the EU insti-
tutions directly. The former is a common phenomenon in national federalist
systems. For example, the prime ministers of German federal states are aware
of the redistributive consequences of changes in SF policy for their own elec-
torates. They have acted as crucial veto players for the German central
government when the latter aimed at reducing the size of spending on SF
during the Berlin summit in 1999 (Heinelt et al., 2005: 179). Partisan bonds
between regional and central governments have been shown to be important
determinants of the allocation of national investment policies (Kemmerling
and Stephan, 2002). It is reasonable to assume a similar tendency at the EU
level. National policy-makers have to take the distributional consequences of
changes in SF policy into consideration. The more that partisan channels
transmit these consequences, the more likely it is that policy-makers will take
them into consideration.
Stronger subnational entities, such as German or Austrian Länder, have
also approached the EU Commission directly (Jeffrey, 1996). All German
Länder have their own representations in Brussels, which shows that this
direct lobbying is seen to be a beneficial investment. The principle of partner-
ship establishes such political communication officially, since the Commission
actively seeks to engage with subnational tiers of the political system. As a
consequence, lobbying by regions in Brussels has increased (Allen, 2000: 259).
Local authorities, and with them partisan actors, not only cooperate with
national governments in the planning and monitoring stages, but also inter-
vene in the policy process via a host of formal and informal committees such
as the Economic and Financial Committee (ECOFIN), the Council of Regional
Ministers and the Committee of Regions and Local Authorities.
These channels allow regional partisan actors to participate in the nego-
tiations between the Commission and the member states. We summarize this
discussion in the form of two main hypotheses that link the underlying politi-
cal space in the European Union with redistributional outcomes in SF policies.
H1: Regions in which parties on the left of the spectrum are strong should receive
more Structural Funds than other regions.
The distribution of Structural Funds across regions should correspond to
traditional partisan preferences for more or less spending. The causal mech-
anism for this hypothesis is analogous to that for national political systems.
According to their ideologies, parties from the left always prefer higher levels
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of spending than do parties on the political right. This hypothesis is a typical
marginal argument. All else being equal, we expect left-wing parties to receive
more SF per capita than right-wing parties. Obviously, any regional govern-
ment will try to maximize its own revenues. Given their ideological stance,
however, left-wing parties should be more capable of doing so since this corre-
sponds to the ideological preferences of their voters (Roemer, 2001). Because
SF are the EU’s major redistributive tool that is directly comparable to national
redistribution, these preferences should be visible in the form of higher levels
of SF.
H2: If a pro-EU vs. anti-EU cleavage exists, regions in which Eurosceptic parties
are strong will receive more Structural Funds in order to buy the political acqui-
escence of these voters.
The causal mechanism for the second hypothesis is more complicated. We
expect that SF policy does not (only) serve the purpose of enhancing socio-
economic cohesion. We rather think of SF policy as a means of compensating
political losers or those who protest against EU integration. If this is the case,
it is reasonable to assume that major parties and political actors have to pacify
Eurosceptic voters through substantial transfers. A good example is Ireland,
which is one of the countries that have received most SF on a per capita basis.
Until the mid 1990s, Ireland received up to 5% of national GDP in annual
transfers for cohesion and restructuring. Most Irish are in favour of the EU –
as Eurobarometer data show – but this does not deter them from voting
against crucial reforms when national politics overrides EU issues, such as in
the case of the Nice Treaty in the referendum of June 2001. In these cases, SF
could act as a political compensation for voters’ agreement on further steps
in European integration.5
If the institutional critique is correct, both hypotheses depend on the insti-
tutional characteristics of national political systems. Hence, it is possible that
partisan effects are stronger in federalist political systems where regional
actors have more political clout than they do in centralized systems (Hooghe
and Keating, 1994). It is also likely that partisan effects are stronger if the same
party rules on different levels of government. Given the complexity of the
EU’s political system, our hypotheses are highly stylized. They are, however,
the closest analogy to similar studies done on national redistributive policies.
The next section will show how these hypotheses are operationalized.
Descriptive empirics and data
In this section we introduce indicators measuring regional partisanship and
the SF received per subnational unit. Given the huge diversity of national
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political systems in the EU, both variables are difficult to operationalize. We
turn first to the partisan variables, for which data from the 1999 elections to
the European Parliament are used. To measure SF allocation at the regional
level, we use the official data of the EU Commission’s financial budgetary
planning for the period 2000–6. Here we focus primarily on a short descrip-
tion of how these Funds are allocated across EU regions.
Data on regional partisan cleavages
Measuring the regional distribution of different party families across Europe
is a daunting task. Not only are party families in some instances character-
ized by high internal heterogeneity and temporal instability (see e.g. Hix and
Lord, 1997), but systems of regional classification also differ widely across
Europe. We therefore decided to gather data for the 1999 European Parlia-
mentary election for 116 regions. Using data on EP elections has some advan-
tages over national data, since they reveal the actual voting behaviour at the
same point in time for all countries. We computed the vote share of parties
for the regional level corresponding to the EU’s NUTS classification.6 For
Portugal and Finland we could not match the national administrative system
of election statistics with the NUTS classification, and so we had to leave these
countries unaccounted for.
Comparing party votes across European regions is naturally problematic.
In order to enable a meaningful comparison, we linked each national party
to its corresponding party faction in the European Parliament. All in all, there
were seven party families represented in the EP between 1999 and 2004. The
British Labour Party, for example, is part of the Socialist Group in the
European Parliament (PES). For all these parties we report their votes received
according to region in national elections and in the European elections, respec-
tively. If two leftist parties in a region were members of the same faction in
the EP, we added both percentage votes. With this procedure we have lost
the information on individual parties, but we have gained comparability
across European regions and elections.
The two variables of major interest are the sizes of left parties and
Eurosceptic parties in regional elections (LEFTPAR and ESCEP). We defined
the following European party factions as being part of a leftist party family:
the Party of European Socialists Group, the Confederal Group of the European
United Left/Nordic Green Left, and the Greens/European Free Alliance
Group. The share of Eurosceptic parties contains the regional votes for the
following factions: the Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic
Green Left, Union for Europe of the Nations, the Group for a Europe of
Democracies and Diversities, the Technical Group of Independent Members,
and factionally independent EP members. Note that, according to our coding,
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the Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left is part
of both the leftist and the Eurosceptic group. In order to provide an idea of
party competition in European regions, we added the Effective Number of
Parties (ENP). ENP is a Herfindahl index and is defined as the inverse of the
sum of squared party shares. The appendix shows the summary statistics for
our variables of interest for the European elections.7
Data on Structural Funds
Data on SF originate from the DG Budget of the EU Commission and repre-
sent the financial perspective of the distribution of SF for the years 2000–6.
We extracted information on Funds for Objectives 1 and 2, which are the only
fiscal transfers that can be attributed to individual regions. Funds for these
two objectives make up roughly 70% of total spending on SF. Unfortunately,
the Commission does not report data at the same aggregation level in all
countries, but in some instances uses NUTS 1, NUTS 2 or even the national
level. This is due to the administrative structure of each member state. Ireland,
for instance, counts as a single Objective 1 region, whereas in Germany the
beneficiaries are the Länder (NUTS 1). In France, recipients of Objective 1
Funds are the Régions, which correspond to NUTS 2. All together, we gathered
information for 83 out of a total 137 European regions that receive Objectives
1 and 2 funding.
SF are officially allocated according to transparent criteria such as, for
Objective 1 Funds, the 75% average EU GDP threshold or, for Objective 2
Funds, the status of being an industrial region in decline. SF allocations,
however, correlate only weakly with these official indicators. Figure 1 shows
the relationship between SF and GDP per capita. We use the sum of per capita
Objective 1 and 2 Funds per region and show its relation to GDP per capita
at the regional level.8 Obviously, there is a negative relationship between these
two variables, but ‘being poor’ is neither a strong nor a sufficient predictor of
the amount of SF per head a region receives, as the upper-left observations
and the outlier of Ireland show. If we were to use other information, such as
the per capita level of agricultural funds, we would also not find a particu-
larly strong relationship. There is a trade-off between Structural and Agricul-
tural Fund spending, but regional diversion along this trade-off is high. Our
conjecture is that partisan politics explains some of this residual variation.
Testing the hypotheses
This section provides an empirical test for the two partisan hypotheses. We
are interested in how far partisan politics shapes the regional allocation of SF
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in Europe. Therefore the effects of two different sets of variables are explored.
First, official economic criteria such as per capita GDP (GDP/CAP) for ‘Objec-
tive 1’ and the unemployment rate (UNEMP) for ‘Objective 2’ should have
an impact on the allocation of SF per capita. In addition, SF should be comple-
mentary to Agricultural Funds per capita. Unfortunately, only national shares
of agricultural transfers (AGRAR/CAP) are available. Second, we consider
the notion that partisan politics also influences the allocation of SF. Our main
interest lies in testing the impact of the size of left parties (LEFTPAR) and
Eurosceptic parties (ESCEP) on the allocation. We expect both variables to
raise regional SF.
Some scholars argue that partisan politics should play a role only where
political institutions allow regional actors to be influential (Hooghe and
Keating, 1994). We therefore add two indicators as proxies for institutional
effects. One is the Effective Number of Parties (ENP). It has been argued that
proportional voting systems usually generate more effective political actors
than do majoritarian systems, and are therefore biased towards more
spending (e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 2004). The reason is that coalition
governments are more likely in multi-party systems, and these coalitions are
difficult to form without further spending. The second indicator is a proxy
for the presence of federalist systems (FED). As outlined earlier, federalist
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Figure 1 Regional distribution of Structural Funds and GDP per capita.
systems grant more influence to subnational actors, which should in turn lead
to more spending for these regions. We used a dummy variable from Persson
and Tabellini (2003), where federal systems are coded with 1.
We tested our hypotheses with the data set on SF and the results of the
1999 European elections. The previous section showed that these partisan
data are a reasonable way of depicting regional-level political cleavages, no
matter how ‘second order’ elections to the EP are supposed to be. Electoral
patterns are similar enough to enable meaningful interpretations to be drawn
from the European elections. In addition, because of data constraints for
national elections, we increase the number of observations by using the
European election data. The appendix shows the summary statistics of our
variables.
The estimation method is ordinary least squares (OLS) with the logarithm
of the SF per capita (log OBJ/CAP) as the dependent variable. Our depen-
dent variable is, however, truncated. Many European regions receive no SF
at all, which might lead to biased results if we were to include all observa-
tions in our regression and not just those regions receiving SF. A standard
remedy for this problem is the use of a Tobit model. As Hug (2003: 263) argues,
the truncated regression is preferable if ‘important omitted variables influ-
ence simultaneously the selection into the incomplete data set and the depen-
dent variable of the outcome equation’. As argued above, it is unlikely that
the bargaining processes for selecting regions and distributing SF are the
same. In such circumstances, it is difficult to establish whether the Tobit
results are always superior to OLS. Ideally, one would use a selection model
that explicitly accounts for differences in the selection and distribution stages,
but this is beyond the scope of this paper.9 Therefore we present both OLS
and Tobit results in Table 1.
The first model estimates the effects of our main independent variables.
We include three variables that depict the official allocation criteria
(GDP/CAP [log], UNEMP [log] and AGRAR/CAP [log]) in addition to Feder-
alism (FED) and the Effective Number of Parties (ENP) as control variables.
As expected, GDP per capita has a negative and strongly significant impact
on the regional allocation of SF. The sign of the coefficient of the unemploy-
ment rate (UNEMP) is positive but insignificant. The allocation of Agricul-
tural Funds per capita (AGRAR/CAP) has a positive coefficient, suggesting
that beneficiaries of Agricultural Funds also receive more SF. The variable,
however, is far from being significant. Our partisan variables confirm our
hypotheses. The share of left parties in the European elections at the regional
level (LEFTPAR) and the share of Eurosceptic parties (ESCEP) have the
expected positive signs and are also significant at the 10% level. Apparently,
the strength of left and Eurosceptic parties adds substantial information to
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the puzzle of SF allocation. Partisan politics also explains the outlier of Ireland
in Figure 1, because Ireland has strong Eurosceptic parties. As for our two
institutional variables, we see that neither the federalism (FED) nor the multi-
party system indicator (ENP) performs particularly well. Since we lack
partisan data for some regions, the number of observations amounts to 71 in
models 1 to 3. We also tested for correlation between the independent vari-
ables but failed to find strong correlations.
Based on the coefficients in model 1 we see that a 1 percentage point
increase in the vote share of left parties increases the allocation of SF by 2.9%.
An increase in Eurosceptic parties by 1 percentage point increases the regional
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Table 1 Regression results for Structural Funds and partisan politics
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
OLS OLS OLS Tobit model
Constant 33.758*** 35.065*** 31.089*** 9745.255**
5.96 (6.2) (5.21) (3.34)
GDP/CAP (log) –3.074*** –3.232*** –2.862*** –1032.7***
(–6.01) (–6.28) (–5.39) (–3.91)
UNEMP (log) 0.21 0.077 0.367 294.006*
(0.85) (0.3) (1.35) (2.27)
AGRAR/CAP (log) 0.009 0.114 0.089 143.463
(0.03) (0.37) (0.29) (0.9)
LEFTPAR 2.949* 3.097** 2.394 151.122
(2.57) (2.72) (1.98) (0.27)
ESCEP 3.061* 2.827* 2.392 107.54
(2.55) (2.37) (1.86) (0.2)
FED –0.47 –0.556* –0.261 197.49
(–1.8) (–2.11) (–0.86) (1.57)
ENP –0.106 –0.104 –0.063 –219.248***
(–0.77) (–0.76) (–0.45) (–3.89)
LEFTPAR  FED 3.884
(0.114)
ESCEP  FED 2.813
(1.36)
N (censored) 71 71 71 116 (71)
Adj. R2 0.7301 0.7367 0.7337
F-test 28.06*** 25.49*** 25.11***
LR Chi2 87.28***
Log likelihood –567.971
Pseudo R2 0.0714
Notes: t-values in parentheses; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
allocation by as much as 3%. The appendix contains two partial plots for the
effects of LEFTPAR and ESCEP in model 1. The visual inspection shows that
the partial residuals of LEFTPAR are robust against outliers, whereas ESCEP,
though not unreliable, is more sensitive. However, one caveat applies. It is
possible that regional voter behaviour might be influenced by the amount of
SF a region receives. If this were the case, the causal effect could be reversed.
In fact, Mattila (2003) shows that turnout in European elections is influenced
by the EU subsidies a country receives, although this effect is not very strong.
If, on the other hand, subsidies had an impact on voter behaviour, we would
underestimate rather than overestimate the coefficients of our main indepen-
dent variables.
We also tested for interaction effects in models 2 and 3. In particular, we
test whether the impact of left and Eurosceptic parties on SF allocation is
contingent on the degree of federalism. In order to construct our interaction
terms LEFTPAR  FED and ESCEP  FED, we re-parameterized the vari-
ables by subtracting the means from LEFTPAR, ESCEP and FED before multi-
plying these variables. This has the advantage that the coefficients of
LEFTPAR and ESCEP in models 2 and 3 depict their effects for the mean value
of FED. Model 2 shows that including LEFTPAR  FED as interaction term
slightly improves the significance and size of the coefficient of LEFTPAR,
although the interaction term is insignificant. In model 3, the interaction term
ESCEP  FED affects the significance of LEFTPAR and reduces the coefficient
and significance of ESCEP.10
The fourth model is our Tobit estimate. We use SF per capita rather than
its logarithm as the dependent variable. All of the 116 European regions for
which we have data go into the regression. The Tobit model results show at
first glance that all coefficient signs, except for FED, remain stable. Further
inspection shows that all t-values stay in a similar range compared with the
t-values of model 1, and even with the t-values of the OLS model with the
non-logarithm dependent variable (not displayed). Only the effective number
of parties (ENP) changes its t-value and significance level compared with
model 1. LEFTPAR and ESCEP lose their significance in the Tobit model. We
cannot give a definitive answer as to which OLS or Tobit regression better
suits the data. The Tobit model corrects for truncated data, whereas our OLS
regression fits the skewed distribution better for regions receiving SF, using
the dependent variable logarithm. We argue, however, that the explanatory
power of our main independent variables, LEFTPAR and ESCEP, applies only
to those regions that receive at least some SF. We do not claim that the vote
share of Eurosceptic or left parties explains why a region that is not officially
eligible does not receive any funding.
Figure 2 shows that there is indeed no correlation between the share of
European Union Politics 7(3)3 8 6
left parties and SF allocation for those regions that are not eligible for funding.
For the eligible regions, however, there is a strong positive correlation. The
figure displays the regression line only for the regions receiving SF. We there-
fore conclude that party politics matters in regions that are eligible for
funding. However, the relationship between eligibility for SF and partisan
politics is unlikely to be equivalent to the relationship between the distri-
bution of SF and partisan politics. Here, official criteria such as GDP per capita
and the unemployment rate would need to be addressed in detail. Moreover,
our dependent variable data are not exactly suitable for the Tobit model. Since
addressing the selection bias is not without caveats either (Bodenstein and
Kemmerling, 2004), there is no clear strategy for which model should be
preferred. We therefore regard only the OLS estimates as inferences for those
regions that actually qualify as SF regions.
Conclusions
This paper has explored the impact of European partisan politics on the allo-
cation of SF in subnational European regions. There is an ongoing debate
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about which political actors at different political levels shape European SF
policy, and whether this policy field is giving rise to a new mode of European
governance. Partisan politics does not play a major role in this literature. At
the national level, in contrast, partisan explanations for redistributive prefer-
ences are fairly widespread. This insight prompted us to delve deeper into
the impact that European party politics has on SF policy, a core European
redistributive policy area.
We have argued that partisan politics can influence the allocation of SF
in at least two ways. First, regional parties can affect the behaviour of sub-
national or national governments. If a region is dominated by parties with a
high ideological preference for regional policy, regional politicians will lobby
for SF harder than will national governments. Second, regional partisan actors
can lobby the EU Commission and other European actors directly. To the
extent that the EU Commission has discretionary power over the distribution
of SF, strong regional actors can try to influence the distribution of these funds
directly. Given these two channels, party composition is likely to influence
the allocation of SF. Therefore we applied the traditional partisan hypothesis
from the literature on national redistribution and have found visible, though
not always robust, evidence for a link between partisanship and SF policy at
the regional level.
Studies on European distributional policies primarily focus on redistri-
bution between EU member states and assess the role that negotiations in the
Council of Ministers play in this process. This paper has shifted the focus to
subnational actors, especially in the regions, and has explored the role of
parties instead of governments. Thus far, interregional redistribution has
rarely been addressed, despite its normative importance in the European
Union. If, for instance, interregional redistribution is really driven by politi-
cal or institutional factors, this may be one reason Structural Funds have
proved ineffective in economic terms (e.g. Boeri et al., 2002). This implies that
the abolition of Structural Funds, as suggested by some economists, would
lead to serious political problems in particularly sensitive regions.
Notes
We would like to thank Thomas Plümper, Gerald Schneider, Philipp Mohl and
the three anonymous reviewers for their comments.
1 A further complication is that the Commission deals with a diverse set of
subnational actors. National governments select subnational partners, with
the result that the implementation of the partner principle varies across EU
member states (e.g. Sutcliffe, 2000).
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2 A further caveat is that European issues are of low political salience. Elec-
tions for the European Parliament (EP) are generally considered to be second-
order competitions (Reif, 1984). We address this issue in the empirical section
of the paper.
3 For the financial period 2000–6, the decision procedure follows Council Regu-
lation (EC) 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999.
4 Although the EP has gained in importance through the Amsterdam Treaty,
its discretionary power to change the list of regions or transfers to specific
regions is limited (Heinelt et al., 2005). It can, however, lobby the Council and
the Commission in the name of regional interests in the wake of important
summits.
5 Mattila (2003), for instance, finds that voter turnout in EP elections responds
positively to the size of the EU transfers a country receives.
6 The NUTS classification (Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques)
is the standardized classification of subnational unities in the European
Union. It distinguishes between three hierarchical regional levels, which do
not necessarily coincide with real administrative units.
7 We have compared our regional election data for the EP with the respective
regional election data for national elections preceding the EP 1999 elections
(Caramani, 2000). T-tests for the variables of both elections show that the
differences are marginal. Even though EP elections are less salient politically,
this does not affect the regional variation in partisan cleavages. We conclude
that data from the EP elections are suitable for our purpose. Both our data
set and the appendix are available on the EUP homepage (http://www.
uni-konstanz.de/eup/issues.htm).
8 We could not include spending on Objective 3, since the EU Commission does
not provide the necessary information for the regional level. Its overall
importance is, however, marginal compared with Objectives 1 and 2.
9 An alternative model to control for selection bias would be a Heckman selec-
tion model. However, this necessitates a thorough understanding of what
drives the process of granting a region the status of an SF beneficiary in
general. Since we lack a theory for this selection process, we refrain from
using the Heckman model.
10 We have also experimented with further interactions. There is a weak inci-
dence that the party system and the congruence between national and
European elections enhance the partisan effects. Results are available on
request.
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